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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the effect of ownership type on the social performance 
in microfinance institutions (MFIs). First, I look at the theory concerning microfinance 
institutions, ownership and social performance. Then I will perform three different tests. First 
a t-test is used, then a probit regression with control variables, and finally a robustness check. 
I look at how two different ownership types affects six social performance variables. I will 
focus on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and shareholder firms (SHFs). Three of the 
social performance variables are often used when measuring social performance, and three of 
them are quite new when measuring social performance. The data contains 478 MFIs from 77 
different countries in the period 1996 to 2012. To generate the results, both simple bivariate 
regression and multivariate regression is applied. The null hypothesis used, states that NGOs 
are more socially oriented than SHFs. The results from the study show that only the variable 
percentage of female clients and average loan size is significant in all three tests. This may 
indicate that NGOs has a higher percentage of female clients and a lower average loan size 
than SHFs. For the rest of the variables it is not possible to say that there is a significant 
difference between NGOs and SHFs, this because these variables where not significant in two 
of three tests. The results show some divergence against paradigms in the industry. However, 
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1	  Introduction	  
“But we have created a society that does not allow opportunities for those people to take care 
of themselves because we have denied them those opportunities.” 
Muhammad Yunus 
 
Microfinance can be defined as supplies of loans, savings, credit, insurance, and payment 
services to people that are relatively poor (Copestake, 2007). It gives people that do not have 
access to traditional services an access to low-cost short-term financial products (Balkenhol, 
2007). Microfinance as we know it today emerged in the 1970s, when pioneers like Grameen 
Bank started issuing small loans to women (CGAP, 2006). The microfinance industry is 
growing fast, with an increase in more borrowers almost each year since 1999 (CGAP, 
2009a). As the microfinance industry has grown, the scope of organizational forms in the 
industry has become broader. The most dominating organizational forms are NGOs, SHFs 
and COOPs, that all have different structures and incentives (Hansmann, 1996). 
  
Even though most of the MFIs have an equal goal to improve the welfare of the poor, they do 
not have an equal way on how to best achieve this goal (Schreiner, 2002). MFIs have two 
objectives to achieve; financial sustainability and outreach to the poor. How the MFIs achieve 
the dual objective can be affected by the type of ownership. (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). These 
two objectives often conflicts, and there might be a trade-off between these to objectives 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). When trying to achieve the financial goals, there is a risk 
that they will loose sight of the social goals. That instead of improving outreach to poorer 
customers, the MFIs focuses on making higher profits (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). 
 
Some believe higher profits lead to lower outreach. Others think the commercialized MFIs are 
better in serving the poorest because of their profit motives that makes them more efficient 
and wanting to look for new markets for their products (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Earlier, 
SHFs where considered more profit oriented than NGOs, and that NGOs cared more about 
reaching the poorest. However, there has been observed NGOs that has the same economic 
rationalism as profit-oriented banks. In addition, many SHFs have the same social mission as 
NGOs, and are not only concerned about making profit. Hence, as Mersland & Strøm (2008) 
mention, the difference between types of ownership may not be as clear as expected.  
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Growth in MFIs is much due to the insistence on financial sustainability. But for most 
practitioners and funders it is important to also reach the poor, provide quality services, and 
improve clients’ lives. Hence, both financial and social performance is important. Many 
funders and financial institutions are therefore seeking after more ways to measure social 
performance in addition to measure financial performance. The increasing interest in social 
performance tries to shed more light on how the lives of poor people are being affected by 
financial services. Donors, foundations, individuals and government put money in 
microfinance because they have a belief that microfinance help poor people. MFIs should 
therefore be able to report on how or whether they achieve the promised goals (CGAP, 2007). 
 
There is a supply challenge in the microfinance market, and hence there is a need for more 
knowledge about factors that influence the social performance of microfinance suppliers 
(Mersland, 2009a). Financial indicators have been developed over many years, and most of 
them are precise in both their measurement and in what they mean. Social performance is 
fairly new, and it is therefore a difficult process. For most social performance indicators they 
are naturally less straightforward. The result has been a much larger set of indicators than 
what was preferred. Over the last few years there has been important, but separate attempts to 
integrate the assessment of social performance into the regular management system of 
financial institutions	   (CGAP, 2007). More and more tools have been developed to support 
MFIs in improving their social performance (Lapenu, Bruyne & Verhagen, 2008). 
 
Because the MFIs mission primarily is to reduce poverty, the main objective of this study is to 
look at how types of ownership affect different social performance indicators. I want to see if 
it is true that NGOs reach more of the social performance goals than what SHFs do. Since 
there also are discussions off how well the different social performance measures really are, 
and many attempts in finding new and improved measures, both three “old” and three “new” 
measures will be used. I will also look at the correlation between the old and new variables. 
 
The following chapters are structured as follows. The next chapter will be an overview of the 
microfinance industry. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the study and 
hypothesis formulations. Then, chapter 4 is a presentation of variables used. Chapter 5 
contains data and research methodology. In chapter 6, the data analysis and findings are 
presented. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
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2	  Microfinance	  
2.1 Types of Ownership 
In the microfinance governance literature there is an essential topic about whether the 
performance in MFIs is explained by the type of ownership. There are a various types of 
organizations in the microfinance sector. This, among others, could be banks, NBFIs, and 
NGOs (Barth et al., 2012). The intrinsic difference between SHFs and NGOs lies in who 
controls the organization and who that receives the profit from it (Mersland, 2009b). 
 
NGOs are the pioneers in the microfinance industry. They are usually the first to start offering 
services to the poor in a specific region or to a specific segment in the population. Most 
NGOs obtain funds from donations and commercial borrowing (Barth et al., 2012). NGOs are 
not allowed to distribute profits to persons that have control over the firm. All of the residual 
earnings must instead be retained and devoted to finance services that the organization is 
meant to provide. Since a NGO has this constraint over the distribution, the NGO has no 
owner. There is no person who has a share in both controlling the firm and in residual 
earnings (Hansmann, 1996). 
 
In contrast to NGOs we have SHFs. In a SHF, shareholders are controlling the organization, 
and they decide who receives profits (Mersland, 2009b). SHFs can be divided into NBFIs and 
Banks. NBFIs and Banks are comparable, but with some differences (Barth et al., 2012). 
Banks can both be publicly owned and privately owned. They are formal, for-profit financial 
institutions and are normally regulated by central banks. They offer any type of financial 
services like lending, savings accounts, deposit taking, payment services and money transfers. 
NBFIs are, like banks, often for-profit institutions, but their funding structure is very 
different. They rely much more on debt and donations, since most of them are not allowed to 
take deposits. NBFIs provide similar services as banks, but are licensed under a separate 
category. This separation could be due to lower capital requirements, limitations on what they 
offer of financial services (some NBFIs cannot provide saving accounts), or supervision under 
a different state agency (Barth et al., 2012). 
 
2.2 Micro Products and Services 
The products and services most MFIs offer differs from normal bank loans because of the 
type of clients they serve (Barth et al., 2012). Micro services are services to low-income 
clients. The main financial services that MFIs provide is credit services, this is something all 
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MFIs offer. But also savings, insurance and payment services are offered by many MFIs. 
Which type of financial services that are provided depends on the objectives the MFIs have, 
the demands of its target market, and the structure of the institution. In addition to financial 
services, many MFIs offer social and development services. Development services could be 
skills training and basic business training. Social services could be health care, education, 
development of self-confidence and literacy training (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
 
Micro credit 
MFIs provide credit, and this must be successfully designed so they meet the clients’ needs 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). Lenders in MFIs take small, repeated loans that are unsecured and on 
short term (Barth et al., 2012). It is possible for the clients to both have individual or group-
based loans. Individual loans are given to individuals who have some kind of assurance of 
repayment and some level of security that they will repay the loans. Group-based loans are 
either loans given to groups that sub-loan forward to their members, or a loan that are given to 




Low income clients in MFIs can and do save. Offering saving accounts to the clients can be a 
highly valued service since many of the poor do not have reliable places to secure their money 
or an option to earn return on their savings. Compulsory saving is when borrowers as a 
condition of receiving a loan has to save an amount of the loan, sometimes as a percentage 
and sometimes as a nominal amount. Voluntary savings are savings that are not an obligatory 
part of accessing credit services. This is saving after borrowers and non-borrowers needs 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
 
2.3 Social Performance of MFIs 
The Social Performance Task Force has a consensus about the following definition for social 
performance: 
Social Performance is the effective translation of an institution’s social goals into 
practice in line with accepted social values; these include sustainably serving 
increasing numbers of poor and excluded people, improving the quality and 
appropriateness of financial services, improving the economic and social conditions of 
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clients, and ensuring social responsibility to clients, employees and the community 
they serve (CGAP, 2007, p. 3). 
Social performance is in the microfinance industry commonly defined as the ability an MFI 
has to effectively translate the institutions social goals into practice. It means that an MFI 
should not do any harm, and that it is proactive in fulfilling its mission. Do no harm means 
that the client should not be worse off after the intervention of a MFI due to before. This 
includes avoiding client indebtedness, not adding unnecessary administration burdens on the 
clients, and stop transferring risk to the clients. The social goals are outlined in the 
organizations mission and vision (Leonard, Linder, Faris, Lal & Meggs, 2009). Social 
performance indicators help MFIs to specify data to collect so they over time can assess and 
track how well they are achieving its mission (SPTF, 2012). 
 
2.4 Growth of MFIs 
Donors give billions of dollars to support the expansion of microfinance programs. This due 
to a “win-win” proposition that says that the MFIs that follow the good banking principles, 
will also alleviate the most poverty. When eventually achieving financial sustainability, MFIs 
will be able to grow without donor money. These MFIs will then be able to serve more poor 
people than MFIs getting subsidies (Morduch, 2000). An MFI that can cover its costs can also 
grow, thus serving more and more clients. Therefore there is almost a unanimous consensus 
that financial sustainability is a crucial measurement of the success of MFIs (CGAP, 2007). 
 
Today there are more than 400 sustainable institutions that report to the leading source for 
market data, called the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX). The microfinance 
industry is growing fast, with an increase in more borrowers almost each year since 1999 
(CGAP, 2007). Christen et al. (2004) report about 500 million persons served, mostly with 
savings account. Microcredt Summit reported in their 2006-meeting about 100 million 
borrowers (Mersland, 2009b). 
 
Table 2.1 below, shows an overview of the total number of borrowers every other year from 
year 2001 until 2013. We see that for every year there is a little increase in number of MFIs 
reporting their numbers. In December 2013, there was reported that 211.1 million borrowers 
where reached. There is also an increase in number of borrowers for every second year. Total 
number of poorest borrowers has been increasing each year for several years, except in 2013. 
But in terms of percentage of the total number of poorest borrowers, there has not been an 
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increase every year. The total number of poorest borrowers that are women has been quite 
stable with a percentage slightly above 80 percent for most years. In 2013, it was 82.6 percent 















2001 2 186 54 932 235 26 878 332 
(48.9%) 
21 169 754 
(78.8%) 
2003 2 931 80 868 343 54 785 433 
(67.7%) 
45 242 725 
(82.5%) 
2005 3 133 113 261 390 81 949 036 
(72.4%) 
68 933 027 
(84.1%) 
2007 3 552 154 825 825 106 584 679 
(68.8%) 
88 726 893 
(83.3%) 
2009 3 589 190 135 080 128 220 051 
(67.4%) 
104 694 115 
(81.7%) 
2011 3 703 195 014 970 124 293 727 
(63.7%) 
102 749 643 
(82.7%) 
2013 3 725 211 119 547 114 311 586 
(54.1%) 
94 388 701 
(82.6%) 
Table 2.1: The growth of total borrowers in MFIs for the last years 
Source: Microcredit Summit Campaign, The Annual Microcredit Summit Campaign Reports.  
 
2.5 Debates Regarding the Microfinance Industry 
A very hot topic regarding MFIs has been the issue of social impact. The question is about 
what beneficial effect microfinance has created to the poor that they are supposed to alleviate 
and serve. However, it has been a difficult question to answer, because microfinance has been 
evaluated on its financial performance, and not on its social impact. There has for a long time 
been very little measure of social impact. However, a few years ago, there was a shout of a 
need to determine what value microfinance has made to the society. The debate has been 
focused on whether the microfinance should measure their social impact or their social 
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performance. And while this debate has continued, numerous of institutions have already 
come up with social performance measures (ECLOF, 2012). 
 
A recurring subject of debate in the microfinance sector is the potential conflict between 
economic and social objectives (Gutierrez-Goiria & Goitisolo, 2011). Many lenders started to 
look after ways to make profits on loans they where offering, by shifting from non-profit 
organizations to commercial enterprises. Which resulted in the poor people getting harmed 
(Yunus, 2011). Like mentioned in the introduction, microfinance is considered a “double 
bottom line” sector, with both a financial side and a social responsibility. It is widely believed 
that MFIs have a positive social impact, however, there are some cases where MFIs looses 
their social orientation in the process when they become larger (Gutierrez-Goiria & Goitisolo, 
2011). Mexico`s Compartamos Banco and Bolivia`s BancoSol are two examples. They both 
converted from non-profit to for-profit enterprises so they could broaden their business 
models. In 2007, shareholders of Compartamos Banco went to the stock market and sold their 
shares at a shockingly high price, which made some of them instant millionaires. The main 
reason for the high price was that Compartamos charged very high interest rates from the 
clients, and this resulted in very high profit (CGAP, 2009b). In Banco Sol different owners 
struggled to maintain control. Here some owners where pushing hard for faster profits while 
other owners where pushing to maintain Banco Sol`s microfinance identity (Mersland, 
2009b). 
 
There has until the last years, also been debates about the likelihood of becoming self-
sufficient while working with small amounts of money and people with limited income. The 
critics claimed that MFIs took advantages of subsidies and external support and that this is 
what enables them to work and their feasibility. Today, sustainability is unquestionably 
possible. Now the debates focuses on what kind of measures must be taken to achieve 
sustainability (Gutierrez-Goiria & Goitisolo, 2011). Surveys show that MFIs that target the 
poorest borrowers only generate revenues to cover 70% of their full costs (Morduch, 2000). 
For MFIs to maintain low interest rates, it’s not always possible to remain financially self-
sufficient. It’s complicated to provide lots of tiny microloans to the poor, and therefore it is 
often an expensive business. Many MFIs need government and international donor funds. 
Even with high repayment rate, it can be hard to be self-sustainable (Bateman, 2010). 
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2.6 Microfinance Failures 
There are several scandals that are threatening the reputations of MFIs. Microfinance has been 
held up for decades as a ”miracle cure” for global poverty reduction. “Everyone” was talking 
about the endless of opportunities in lending out small loans for the world´s poorest people. 
However, by 2010, new studies began to challenge the promise of microfinance. There where 
rapidly growing crises in the microfinance industries (Provost, 2012). 
 
High interest rates  
Surveys show that in Africa it is common with a 100% interest rate, and in Mexico it can 
exceed 200% (NRK, 2010). It is common with interest rates of 100% or higher, and interest 
rates under 30% a year are rare (Armitstead, 2012). Compartamos Banco charged very high 
interest rates. Without including the 15% tax paid by clients, the annualized interest rate on 
loans was above 85%. This resulted in an annual return on 55% on shareholders` equity 
(CGAP, 2009b). Hugh Sinclair, a British author and microfinance veteran, discovered that the 
microfinance sector is dominated by profiteers and not by “saints”. In unregulated markets 
where there is minimal client protection, MFIs charge the poor with whatever interest rate 
they could get away with, and this arises problems for the poor. With very high interest rates, 
it is very hard to generate enough money to be able to repay the loans. Sinclair says that there 
is a need for a more comprehensive reform. He wants a regulatory framework that shows how 
the loans benefit the clients, as well as their full costs (Armitstead, 2012). 
 
The fact that MFIs charge very high interest rates is an example of poverty penalty, this 
because the poor has to pay high interest rates to enter the credit market. In order to achieve 
greater social welfare, the work of intermediation should be done with the lowest possible 
cost. If the banks` interest margin is low, then also the social costs of financial intermediation 
should be low, given the MFIs social mission (Cuéllar-Fernándes, Fuertes-Callén, Serrano-
Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2016). In Brennpunkt`s documentary on NRK TV, there is said that 
it is the sky-high interest rates the poor are struggling with. Nurul Kabir, editor in chief New 
Age Magazine, follows the micro lending market close, and says that there is big money to 
earn. A recognized Korean economist, professor Ha-Joon Chang, believes that the high 
interest rates lead the poor into a debt trap. He believes that the poor do not come out of 
poverty when they have to pay a 30-100% interest rate. So although microfinance has been 
regarded as a success, Chang thinks that everything must be examined again (NRK, 2010). 
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Harassments and suicides 
Several agents pressure and harass borrowers that cannot repay their loans. Some say that 
borrowers kill themselves because they cannot repay high-interest loans (Moll, 2011). In 
Andhra Pradesh in India there are some scandalous news about lenders who are being 
encouraged by loan officers to commit suicide to get out of debt. The loan officers do this 
because the borrowers are covered by insurance. There is an obligatory life insurance sold 
with the microloans, and this may be the incentive to why over-indebted borrowers are being 
pressured to take their own life (Dobusch, Mader, & Quack, 2013). Internal documents from 
The Associated Press say that employees verbally had harassed over-indebted borrowers, 
forced them to pawn their valuable items, encouraged other borrowers to humiliate them and 
where sitting outside their homes to publically shame them. Also, in some cases, staff where 
physically harassing defaulters (Business Insider, 2012). In the Brennpunkt documentary, it is 
being told about MFI agents who visit borrower both day and night when they have problems 
repaying their loans. The MFI agents make them sell their things and their house to get 
money, threaten to put them on the street and harasses them. The MFI agents are not leaving 
the house until they have got their money, this result in borrowers who borrow from loan 
sharks to pay their instalments. Because the borrowers get scared, they do as the MFI agents 
say (NRK, 2010). 
 
Corruption 
The low competition in the microfinance market, let lenders earn significant profits by 
providing loans, savings accounts, and related services. Organizations that become for-profit 
publicly traded corporations make a few executives and early investors very wealthy. Critics 
say this could undermine the poverty-fighting purpose these programs have. When 
microfinance grow too much and too fast, this could be because the providers coming in are 
only interested in gaining profits. Some say that high loan-default rates and corrupt officials, 
who exploit lending for personal benefits, are a problem in Africa’s MFIs. Yunus has also 
criticized the industry (Moll, 2011). The reputation of the industry has declined so badly that 
Muhammad Yunus in a meeting to officials in the United Nations said, “We created 
microcredit to fight the loan sharks; we didn’t create microcredit to encourage new loan 
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Microloans are more beneficial to borrowers living above the poverty line 
From different studies it seems that microloans are more beneficial to borrowers that lives 
above the poverty line than for borrowers living below the poverty line. The reason is that the 
borrowers with a higher income are willing to take risks, like investing in new technologies, 
and this is more likely to increase income flows. On the other hand, poor borrowers rarely 
invest in new technology; instead they tend to take out conservative loans that protect their 
subsistence. Vijay Mahajan, who is the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural finance 
institution, concludes that microcredit seems to do more harm than good to the poorest 
borrowers. Microloans reduce the cash flow to the poorest of the poor. One reason could be 
the high interest rates that are charged. If the poor clients are not able to earn a greater return 
on their investments than the interest they have to pay, the result will be that they become 
poorer of microcredit, and not wealthier (Karnani, 2007). 
	  
2.7 Importance of Social Performance Today 
More than ever before, there is a broad agreement that social performance is important to help 
MFIs in achieving their social mission (CGAP, 2013a). Social performance of investments 
has become a topical issue in discussions. Social objectives are intentionally pursued and 
honored (Lapenu et al., 2008). Investors are agreeing that there is a need for action. 
Microfinance investors are now openly discussing responsible investments; this includes 
balancing returns and how to reduce the risks of market saturation and over-indebtedness. The 
heated debates and investors efforts are signaling maturity and investors` wish to move 
beyond the crises to concrete actions, which will make the sector more responsible (CGAP, 
2013b). 
 
There have been some reservations about the need of social performance measures. If there 
really is a need for a new set of reporting standards and if it is even possible to standardize 
measures for social performance. Opponents believe that the high demand among the poor for 
services and that they are relative price insensitive, are enough sufficient proof that 
microfinance services are socially useful. Thus, the additional assessments will therefore be 
unnecessary. However, a high demand does not automatically indicate that there is an 
increase in people`s conditions. One reason why people come back could be due to spiralling 
indebtedness, meaning that they borrow money to pay back other debts (CGAP, 2007). 
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There are new challenges in the microfinance sector. A growing microfinance industry and 
new partnerships that are emerging are resulting in an increasing competition and a financial 
pressure. This evolving context increases the exposure to risks, and as a consequence, there is 
no guarantee for the double bottom line of microfinance anymore. There is also a real risk of 
mission drift (Leonard et al., 2009). In the future, one can expect that there is a decrease in the 
resources for development assistance from public donors. Yet, there will be a growing interest 
for microfinance for the private social investors. To report if MFIs have managed the 
objectives in the double bottom line, it would then be important for them to have similar 
financial and social objectives. It could also be possible to improve the understanding of 
possible trade-off between the economic and social returns on investment (Zeller, Lapenu & 
Greeley, 2003).  
 
There has, for the last decade, been emphasis on the financial performance. However, 
advocates of social performance have argued that it is important with social indicators to keep 
MFIs focused on their clients and is a key building block for the MFI as an institution. Social 
indicators will also help MFIs to assess their social results internally and to report to their 
external stakeholders, especially to donors and investors. If an MFI know how it is 
performing on its social bottom line, it can help to guide the MFI towards its social mission 
(Coleman & Rogers, 2009). 
 
2.8 Ways to Measure Social Performance 
Variables that have been used when measuring social performance before are now being 
replaced or improved by other variables that hopefully are better measures. Researches have 
used different measures, however "social stakeholders", rating agencies, etc. are now 
searching for new and better variables. 
 
Social performance variables used in different research papers 
There is not one widely accepted measure for measuring social performance in MFIs. 
Outreach can be defined in terms of several indicators. Some examples are the percentage of 
female clients, the percentage of rural clients or the average loan size (Balkenhol, 2007). 
Table 2.2 below, gives an overview of some papers and the social performance indicators that 
researchers have used when researching social performance. As we can see from the table, all 
of the papers use variables that are considered as “old” variables. 
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Papers Social performance variables 
Hartarska (2005) • Average loan size 
• Number of current borrowers 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) • Average loan size 
• Number of current borrowers 
Mersland and Strøm (2008) • Percentage of women reached 
• Average outstanding loan per client 
• Number of clients served 
Cull et al. (2009) • Average loan size 
• Percentage of women borrowers 
Mersland and Strøm (2010) • Average loan size 
• Gender bias: women or men 
• Main market of lending: rural, urban or both 
• Lending to groups or individuals 
Hermes et al. (2011) • Average loan size 
• Average savings balance 
• Percentage of women borrowers 
D’Espallier et al. (2013) • Average loan size 
• Percentage of women borrowers 
• If MFI operate in rural area (dummy) 
Serrano-Cinca and Gutiérrez-Nieto 
(2014) 
• Average loan size 
• Percentage of women borrowers 
• Percentage of rural borrowers 
Table 2.2: Social performance variables used in different research papers 
 
The emerge of new social performance indicators 
If the MFIs have common social indicators, it will be easier for them to compare their social 
performance and objectives against other MFIs. It will also make it easier for investors and 
other stakeholders to compare social performance across MFIs in the same country, by region, 
by context, or by services (Coleman & Rogers, 2009). The non-profit organizations, the MIX 
and the SPTF, have developed 11 indicators to be used to measure the social performance of 
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MFIs. These 11 indictors are used to collect social performance data from MFIs around the 
world and to offer a platform for benchmarking and analysis (The MIX). 
 
The non-profit organization CERISE, have tried to improve the social performance 
management by creating indicators to measure social performance that are equal for everyone. 
The Social Performance Indicators Initiative (SPI) was launched in 2002. The intention is to 
develop a conceptual framework for defining social performance in the MFI sector, to find 
out which dimensions and elements to use when measuring social performance (Zeller et al., 
2003). The SPI tool evaluates four dimensions of social performance; these are outreach to 
the poor and excluded populations, adaption of products and services for target clients, 
improving economic and social benefits for the clients, and corporate social responsibility 
towards the clients, the staff, the community and the environment (Lapenu et al., 2008). 
 
In 2005, CGAP together with the Argidius Foundation and the Ford Foundation brought 
together over 30 leaders from different social performance initiatives to share their 
experiences. The reason was to optimize a further improvement on social performance tools. 
After two years of work, it resulted in the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF). The Task 
Force are promoting a stronger industry focus on social performance by adopting a common 
definition, coordinating different initiatives, and creating a common reporting format (CGAP, 
2007). 
 
The SPTF launched the Universal Standards for Social Performance Management in year 
2012. The universal social standards are created by and for people in the microfinance sector 
to help them achieve their social goals. It is a global, collaborative effort to aggregate various 
social performance initiatives into one document, and thus create the universal standards. The 
manual with the Universal Standards includes “standards” of what the institution should 
achieve. Experts working in the field have agreed that these standards are essentials for 
institutions that try to achieve social goals (SPTF, 2012). The universal standards contain 21 
standards divided into six broad categories of activity. Each of the 21 standards is specified by 
a set of corresponding “essential practices” that must be fulfilled to meet the universal 
standards. When financial institutions have engaged with the standards, they improve and 
become better in achieving their social mission (CGAP, 2013a). 
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3	  Theory	  and	  Hypothesis	  Formulation	  
3.1 The Trade off 
The trade off is much discussed in the microfinance literature. There are two objectives to 
achieve for MFIs; outreach to the poor and financial sustainability (Mersland & Strøm, 2014). 
The social performance they want to reach is to try to contribute to development and poverty 
reduction by reaching more clients and poorer clients. The financial performance they try to 
reach is to be financially sustainable and become independent from donors (Barth et al., 
2012). There should be a clear policy that is consistent with its social goals, on the desired 
level of returns. The institution is engaged with funders whose expectations for financial 
returns are aligned with the institutions social goals (SPTF, 2012). 
 
Most of the microfinance lenders pursue both financial and social performance, and therefore 
they can get obvious implications for the governance system (Barth et al., 2012). How the 
MFIs achieve the dual objectives of microfinance differs after type of ownership. Some policy 
makers claim that shareholder ownership is better, this because it can reduce costs, attract 
commercial funds, and benefit from corporate governance systems (Mersland & Strøm, 
2014). The two goals often conflict. There could be a trade-off when MFIs have this dual 
mission, because it is costly to serve the poor. When there is a trade-off between social and 
financial performance, the bad performance on one, can be justified by better performance on 
the other. Clients, employees and investors all have very different interests, and the trade-offs 
between financial and social performance therefore makes microfinance governance extra 
challenging. It is more difficult to control an organization with dual objectives than one with 
only a profit objective (Barth et al., 2012). 
 
There is a global campaign called The Smart Campaign where the purpose is to unite 
microfinance leaders around a common goal. This goal is to keep clients as the driving force 
of the industry. The Smart Campaign tries to help the MFI to continue being both socially 
focused and financially sound. The Smart Campaign works with microfinance leaders to give 
MFIs tools and resources to deliver transparent, respectful and prudent financial services to 
each client. Smart Microfinance is protecting the clients, businesses and the industry as a 
whole, and help MFIs practice good ethics and smart business (The Smart Campaign, 2014). 
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3.2 Moral Hazard and Principal-Agent-Problem 
Moral hazard is when an individual will change its behaviour because its not totally exposed 
to its consequences. Ledgerwood (1999) define moral hazard as “the incentive by someone 
(an agent) who holds an asset belonging to another person (the principle) to endanger the 
value of that asset because the agent bears less than the full consequence of any loss” 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). If both the principal and the agent are utility maximizers, then often, the 
agent will not always act in the principals’ best interest. It is mostly impossible that the agent 
will make optimal decisions from the principals’ viewpoint for zero cost. There will be some 
monitoring and bonding cost, both non-pecuniary and pecuniary. There will also be some 
divergence between what the agent decides and the decisions that would maximize the 
principals’ welfare (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
The principal (the MFI) don’t know much about what the agent (the borrower) are using the 
loan to, or if he will repay the loan. Therefore, to reduce the agency cost, the MFIs make 
costly screening and selection processes, and they will monitor and follow up the customers. 
MFIs also use group guarantees for neighbours, families and friends when they select and 
monitor the clients, this to reduce the cost of adverse selection and moral hazard (Mersland, 
2009b). 
 
Banks monitor borrowers on behalf of the depositors. The depositors have a difficulty to 
determine precisely how the banks manage their money. Owners of SHFs don’t share profit 
with their depositors. They only share losses with them, and they therefore have pecuniary 
incentives for an opportunistic behaviour, including risky lending. An organization without 
owners (NGO) will have fewer incentives to exploit depositors, and the agency cost correlated 
to symmetric information will then be minimized (Mersland, 2009b). 
 
Donors, who play a major role, are influencing the ownership structure in MFIs. They don’t 
know exactly how the MFIs use the money they receive from them. Although there are some 
monitoring schemes, there will still be a risk that MFIs distort the use of donations. Therefore, 
donors prefer contracting with NGOs since they have no owners (Mersland, 2009b). 
 
3.3 Agency Theory 
What separates the ownership types is who controls the organization and who receives profit 
(Hansmann, 1996). Depending on who owns an enterprise, different costs may occur 
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(Mersland, 2009a). Agency cost occurs from the separation of ownership and control, and 
from the collective decision-making. So whether the ownership is a SHF or a NGO, different 
costs will arise (Mersland, 2009b). If there is a separation between ownership and control, 
managers may act in their own preferences or may fail to maximize the firm value. Thus, the 
agency cost of outside ownership is the lost value from managers maximizing their own 
utility instead of the firms’ value (Berger & Patti, 2006). Fama and Jensen (1983) write about 
separation of “ownership” and “control”. Most organizational forms have a contract structure 
that limits the risks undertaken by most agents, this by specifying fixed promised payoffs or 
incentive payoffs tied to specific measures of performance. Separation of decision 
management and residual risk bearing is a characteristic of NGOs. 
 
Often there can be different opinions regarding the firm`s policies and programs when many 
persons share ownership of a firm. There can be different opinions about what are the most 
effective means for achieving the shared goal (Hansmann, 1996). Shareholders want to 
increase the risk, and debt holders want to decrease the risk since the extra risk do not give 
them any additional returns. In microfinance, there is also a conflict between those who 
provide funds with a social motive, like non-commercial investment and donations, and those 
that provide commercial funds. Boards in microfinance face a more difficult task than 
corporations, this because they have to find the right balance between all the different 
interests (Barth et al., 2012). 
 
Incentive problems between owners and managers in NGOs may be clearer than in SHFs. 
However NGOs could reduce adverse selection of customers and avoid moral hazard, because 
they are better able to tap into local information networks. Not every SHF run according to 
the shareholder value model, this because they might be committed to reach the poor. If this is 
true, we would expect that NGOs perform as good as SHFs (Mersland & Strøm, 2009b). 
Since NGOs lack owners with a financial stake in their operations, NGOs are often 
considered to have weaker structures. This will lead to lower financial performance than for 
SHFs. Conversely, NGOs are assumed to be more effective in reaching poor customers than 
what SHFs are. According to this, NGOs should have a lower financial performance but have 
a higher social performance than SHFs (Mersland & Strøm, 2009b). 
 
The MFI`s choice of board and CEO characteristics, might be a consequence of the outreach 
measures that the MFI follows. The choice of outreach is the MFI`s choice of business model, 
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or its choice of market conditions it is facing (Mersland & Strøm, 2009a). In the microfinance 
field the information asymmetry between the board and the CEO is likely to be large 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2009b). An internal auditor in the MFI who reports directly to the board 
will provide the board with independent and objective assessments on the MFIs operations. 
As a result, both financial and social performance should be improved (Mersland & Strøm, 
2009b). Ownership shared between different owners is likely to have different opinions 
regarding policies and strategies. Owners of SHFs consist of a group of heterogeneous profit 
seeking investors. Therefore, there will be an increase in the cost of collective decision 
making when they are to align their preferences. Many NGOs have transformed into SHFs, an 
assumption is that they also have relative high cost of collective decision-making. However, 
policy advocates recommend the inclusion of profit minded investors as a counterweight to 
domination by the original NGO, to improve monitoring and decrease agency cost (Mersland, 
2009b). 
 
In all markets, there exist market imperfections. The microfinance sector is a market where 
market failures exist due to lack of competitions and substantial informational disadvantages 
(Mersland, 2009b). According to Hensmann (1996) non-profit enterprises are able to operate 
successfully in more imperfect markets, like markets where most MFIs operate. This could be 
because NGOs are better at modifying the costs that comes from the market contracts 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2008). The customers in MFIs pay the price of limited competition. High 
interests on loans, low interests on savings, under-consumption or no consumption at all of 
banking services, are all some of the price customers face due to low competition. In rural 
areas, and generally where MFIs exists, there is usually a lack of competition. Additionally, 
clients have limited bargaining power against the provider of micro financial services. The 
limited competition results in lack of incentive in streamlining the operations. If all else is 
constant, SHFs will have a stronger incentive than NGOs to exploit their customers, this 
because owners in SHFs have the right to appropriate the organizations profits (Mersland, 
2009b). 
 
The first goal an MFI has is to reach poorer clients of the population. The second goal is to 
have financial sustainability. Governance is about achieving corporate goals (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2009b). There is an expectation that non-profit organizations, as NGOs, are 
trustworthy in supplying output of promised quality. For-profit organizations, like SHFs, have 
an incentive to offer cheaper output with lower quality in order to increase their profits. In a 
	   27	  
non-profit organization patrons without pecuniary incentives elect the board, there are 
therefore argued that the controlling function of the board is lower. Some boards are even 
self-perpetuating (Hansmann, 1996). Proofs from the history have shown that a large group of 
firms, like nonprofit hospitals, have survived without having owners with pecuniary 
incentives to control management. Therefore there must be other mechanisms to ownership 
control that makes the managers work hard. Competition, public regulation, legal and moral 
constraints, incentive pay aligned with owners` interests, and the management labor market 
are other mechanisms that are often mentioned (Mersland, 2009b). 
 
3.4 Institutional Isomorphism 
In firms’ initial stages of their life cycle, they have a large diversity in approach and in form. 
However, when a firm becomes well established, there is a drive towards homogenization. As 
a result of the activities of a diverse set of organizations there is an emergence and 
structuration of an organizational field. Once the field is established, there is a 
homogenization of the organizations and of the new entrants as well. An organizational field 
is where there is a production of similar services or products. When disparate organizations in 
the same type of business are in an actual field, there emerge powerful forces that make them 
become more similar to one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Institutional theory argues that formal legitimacy is the main objective of organizational 
change. This means that organizations adjust their internal characteristics in order to conform 
to expectations that the key stakeholders in their environment have (Ashworth, Boyne & 
Delbridge, 2005). Isomorphism is the concept that best capture the process of 
homogenization. It is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to look more 
alike other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
 
There are three forces that pressures towards institutional isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism 
is that organizations may copy or imitate other organizations activities, systems or structures. 
There is a desire of innovations that enhance the legitimacy, especially under conditions of 
uncertainty. Coercive isomorphism is when the government, regulatory or other agencies 
exerts external pressures to adopt the structures of systems or rules that they favor. These are 
often associated with legal requirements and different regulations. Normative isomorphism 
describes the effect and influence that professional standards and the professional 
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communities have on the organization. It captures the way organizations are expected to 
conform to standards of professionalism and how organizations adopt systems and techniques 
considered to be legitimate (Ashworth et al., 2005). 
 
3.5 Empirical Literature 
There have been done some other researches about ownerships effect on performance. 
Mersland and Strøm did a research about whether the superiority on performance of 
shareholder owned MFIs is empirically supported. They tested five dimensions of 
performance: cost, depth, breadth, length and scope. What they found is that there are 
minimal differences between shareholder owned MFIs and non-governmental MFIs. They 
found that SHFs and NGOs perform equally well (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). 
 
Hartarska (2005) studied how governance mechanisms affect performance of MFIs in Central 
and Eastern Europe. By holding institutional, macroeconomic, and MFI-specific factors 
constant, he examine how management remuneration, board independence and diversity, and 
external mechanisms of control are affecting performance. The results where that the 
performance where not affected by these known government mechanisms. Also, there were 
different factors that had different effects on outreach and sustainability. An important result 
from this study is that the microfinance board is very important. Associated board members 
impact differently on performance due to different weight on outreach and sustainability by 
various groups of stakeholders. Microfinance boards with larger proportions of unassociated 
directors achieve better results. Therefore it should be independence of the microfinance 
board (Hartarska, 2005). 
 
And in 2007, Hartarska and Nadolnyak made a study about whether the regulated MFIs 
achieve better sustainability and outreach than the non-regulated MFIs. They look at the 
differences in performance between regulated and unregulated MFIs, to establish whether the 
performance or the MFIs are improved by regulatory involvement. Results from this study 
show that regulation did not have an impact on either the social or the financial performance 
in MFIs. But what they found is that outreach is affected by level of deposits (savings) 
(Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). 
 
This may indicate, as Mersland mentioned in one of his paper, that similar to banking 
markets, a mixture of different ownership types is probably what is best for microfinance 
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customers (Mersland. 2009b). 
 
3.6 Hypothesis 
As mentioned in the introduction, NGOs where earlier considered more social oriented than 
SHFs, and SHFs where considered more profit oriented than NGOs. However, there are many 
discussions and research if this really is the case. There have been observed NGOs that are as 
profit-oriented as SHFs, and many SHFs that have the same social mission as NGOs. The 
difference between types of ownership may not be as clear, and I want to examine this. As 
hypotheses, I state that the NGOs have a higher social performance than SHFs. For the t-test 
and the probit model, I have therefore chosen these six hypotheses that I will test for: 
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒   
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦   
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   
𝐻!!:𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟   
 
The null hypotheses, that we want to reject, will then be: 
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠     
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠   
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒   
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦   
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒   
𝐻!":𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑠,𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑡  ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒  𝑎  𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟   
 
For the t-test we test if the means for the two groups are equal (null hypothesis) against that 
the means for the two groups are not equal (alternative hypothesis). This can be written: 
𝐻!: 𝜇! = 𝜇! 
𝐻!: 𝜇! ≠ 𝜇! 
Where 𝜇! and 𝜇! are the means of the two ownership types. 
 
For the probit model we test the significance of a coefficient to test if the parameter is 
significantly different from zero. The focus will be on the social performance indicator. The 
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null hypothesis is then that the coefficient that represents the social performance indicator, 𝛽!, 
is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis will then be that the coefficient, 𝛽!, is not equal to 
zero. This can be written: 
𝐻!:  𝛽! = 0 
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4	  Presentation	  of	  Variables	  Used	  
4.1 Independent Variable 
Type of ownership is the independent (explanatory) variable. I use ownership as an 
independent variable to see if the type of ownership has an effect on the social performance in 
MFIs. As mentioned in the abstract, I will focus on to types of ownership, NGOs and SHFs, 
where SHFs consists of Banks and NBFIs. This means that the independent variable has one 
dummy variable. If the MFI is a NGO, it takes value 0. If the MFI is a Bank or NBFI, it takes 
value 1. 
 
4.2 Dependent Variables 
There are numerous of variables we can choose to look at regarding social performance. All 
the performance variables relate to each other, and all have some kind of impact on the 
performance for MFIs. The social performance variables I have chosen are variables I find 
meaningful to look at after reading and learning about MFIs. To measure social performance 
in this thesis, I will look at both old and new variables. I will look at six variables, where three 
of them are “old” and three are “new”. These variables measure different aspects of social 
performance. The old variables measures depth of outreach, in terms of what type of clients is 




Outreach indicators are both qualitative and quantitative. They are good measures for scale of 
outreach, and good proxies for depth of outreach. Depth of outreach is what type of clients 
that are reached and their poverty level (Ledgerwood, 1999). For the old variables I will focus 
on the outreach in terms of depth. I will look at three proxies for the depth of outreach that 
have been used by several researchers for many years. Section 2.9 showed a table of various 
measures used in different papers, and as we saw, several researchers have used these three 
measures. The variables I have chosen as “old” variables are percentage of female clients, 
percentage of rural clients, and average loan size.  
 
Female clients 
Women have not always been the centres of attention in microfinance. There was little 
interest in women in the first attempts to provide credit in developing countries. However, this 
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attitude has changed during the three last decades and now more MFIs have become 
interested in serving women (D`Espallier et al., 2013). Women are of special interest for 
MFI’s because they almost always make up the poorest segments of society. The women 
often have fewer economic opportunities than what men have. They also have been excluded 
from financial services due to many reasons. One reason is cultural barriers that restrict the 
women to their home, which makes it difficult for them to access financial services 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). 
 
There are three main arguments for why there in the resent years has been an enthusiasm for 
women; these are gender quality, poverty reduction, and MFI efficiency. Microfinance is 
often considered an effective tool to promote women`s empowerment. Men have, more often 
than women, repayment problems, so a higher repayment rate by women should improve 
MFIs efficiency (D`Espallier et al., 2013). A report shows that women in developing 
countries are the poorest of the poor. Thus, gender could be an indicator to assess if MFIs are 
being faithful to their poverty-reduction mission (Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2011). 
 
Some commercial banks don’t want to lend to women or mobilize deposits from them. This 
because the banks have a conception that woman is unable to control the household income  
(Ledgerwood, 1999). However, loans to women are more highly valued by the society 
(Balkenhol, 2007). It is claimed that there is a greater benefit in the household and in the 
community when there is an increase in women`s income relative to an equivalent increase in 
men's income (Ledgerwood, 1999). The Grameen Bank has increased its proportion of 
women from 44 % in 1983 to 95 % in 2001. International organizations like Women`s World 
Banking (WWB), Microcredit summit, USAID and the World Bank has driven the idea that 
microfinance should target women. (D`Espallier et al., 2013). 
 
Since women almost always make up the poorest segments of society, the percentage of 
women as a proxy for depth of outreach will be used. We would here expect that NGOs have 
a higher percentage of female clients than SHFs. 
 
Rural clients 
Most of the MFIs have an objective of poverty reduction and would therefore often like to 
focus on the poorest segments of the population. In many countries there are numerous of 
people that do not have admission to financial services. The poorest of the poor are perhaps 
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not economically active, or that small business operators do not qualify for formal financial 
sector services (Ledgerwood, 1999). Rural clients are typically poorer than people in urban 
areas (Balkenhol, 2007). By offering services in rural areas, it could be possible to reach a 
larger number of poor households. In addition, rural areas are often isolated from markets, 
this often due to lack of infrastructure, which can make it difficult to produce and deliver 
goods (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
 
The percentage of rural clients has a large and significant effect on outreach and a negative 
effect on the financial score (Balkenhol, 2007). Some fear that profit motives could lead MFIs 
to abandon rural populations that live in isolated and climatically harmful conditions. Some 
may instead focus on the urban populations that are less risky. Urban populations are closer to 
economically active commercial centres that provide the dual advantages of low-cost service 
delivery. If shareholders or donors were insisting on increasing the lending volume and 
outreach, there would be a pressure to make larger numbers of loans without proper 
screening. This could result in a decrease in new clients, increase in repeated and larger loans 
and an exclusion of the poor (Bhatt & Tang, 2001). 
 
Since rural clients are typically poorer than people in urban areas, another factor for depth of 
outreach that will be used is the percentage of rural clients. We would here expect that NGOs 
have a higher percentage of rural clients than SHFs. 
 
Average loan size 
Across different MFIs that are operating in different regions, they use average loan size as a 
proxy for poverty, and this is an increasing empirical popularity (Armendáriz & Szafarz, 
2011). Average loan size is directly linked to poverty alleviation (Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015). 
The smaller the average loan size is, the greater is the depth of outreach. Small average loan 
sizes are often being advertised by MFIs as an important indicator concerning the outreach, 
and as a strengthening signal for their main mission (Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2011). MFIs 
reach the really poor only when the loan size is very small. However, even the poorest loan 
clients tend to increase their average loan size over the years as they improve their ability to 
repay (Balkenhol, 2007).  
 
The notation of poverty with average loan size could be dated back to Bolivia`s Bancosol. 
Bancosol deviates from its mission by serving larger loans to wealthier clients for the sake of 
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self-sustainability, and this at the expense of deviating resources away from the poor who 
request smaller loans. Because of this, average loan size has become the most widely used 
proxy in quantitative studies. Some MFIs, like Bancosol, may prioritize self-sustainability at 
the expense of their mission concerning poverty-reduction or outreach maximization 
(Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2011). 
 
Mission drift is a phenomenon where MFIs are increasing their average loan sizes by reaching 
out to wealthier clients, and this is not because of progressive lending reasons or for cross-
subsidization reasons. There arises a mission drift when an MFI reach out to unbanked 
individuals that are wealthier while they at the same time crowd out clients that are poor. This 
appears when the announced mission is not aligned with the average loan size minimization in 
a MFI. Unbanked wealthier clients costs less relative to poor clients, this because they 
typically request larger loan size. When the MFIs have fewer clients and larger loan sizes per 
client, the transaction costs will be lower (Armendáriz & Szafarz, 2011). 
 
Average loan size is a prime outreach measure. There is an expectation that the lower the 
loan, the higher is depth of outreach (Mersland & Strøm, 2009a). As a proxy for depth of 
outreach, the average loan size could therefore be used. We would here expect that NGOs 
have a lower average loan size than SHFs. 
 
New variables 
The old social performance variables may have some weaknesses and therefore may not be 
the most optimal variables to use. Because of this, many search after new and better ways to 
measure social performance and tries find social performance indicators that are broadly 
available. As mentioned in the abstract, I have decided to look at three “new” measures as 
well that are not typically used when measuring social performance. Transparency (with 
respect to interest rates), clients` retention rate, and staff turnover are three important areas of 
social performance that previous research has not examined to a large extent before. These 
three measures, among others, are measures that "social stakeholders", rating agencies etc. 
considers important. As written in section 2.8, The MIX and SPTF have eleven indicators for 
measuring social performance. Transparency, clients’ retention rate and staff turnover are all 
mentioned in these eleven indicators.  
	  
	   35	  
It is especially important to look at whether ownership has anything to say in relation to these 
three because the clients’ satisfaction should be more in focus. In the end, it is the customers 
that should be satisfied. As mention below, when it comes to transparency, interest rates are 
often too high, which does not benefit customers in any way. It is therefore essential in 
pricing to have a well-functioning market, efficiency, healthy competition, and better prices. 
Regarding clients retention rate, it is important with satisfied customers. A MFI should 
therefore have the welfare to the client as a goal. Concerning staff turnover, an employee that 
is committed to the organization and has a good working relationship with the customer, 
could positively impact the quality and then positively affect the satisfaction of the customers. 
 
Transparency 
Interest rates charged by MFIs have more recently been an indicator for social performance. 
With an ever-larger proportion of MFIs moving into for-profit organizations, higher interest 
rates could mean higher returns for the shareholders (Rosenberg, Gaul, Ford & Tomilova, 
2013). To have a well-functioning market, efficiency, healthy competition, and better prices 
for millions of people, it is essential with transparency in pricing. However, a non-transparent 
pricing is common in the microfinance industry. This makes it possible to generate high 
profits by lending to the poor, and makes it a serious market imperfection (Waterfield, 2008). 
 
Transparency in MFIs states if the interest rate is transparent according to the rating agency. 
A study done by the Andhra Pradesh Mahila Abhivruddhi Society 31 (APMAS), shows that 
most of the members they where interviewing did not know about the effective rate of 
interest, method in how they are calculating the rate, or any other loan operational charges. 
This was due to their inability to understand the information they got from the MFIs, or due to 
lack of transparency in MFIs. Many of the members are illiterate and need financial help, and 
therefore just do whatever they are required to get a loan (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010). There 
need to be a priority of transparency in MFIs so there could be established a stable 
microfinance environment. Transparency in the MFIs will help the MFIs to take the 
appropriate setting of priorities. With low transparency, there is unlikely that MFIs are honest 
of what are people`s best interests (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010). 
 
An institution should fully disclose cost and non-cost information, and provide accurate and 
timely information. They should also communicate with the clients in an easily 
understandable way (SPTF, 2012). As mentioned in The SPI tool, social performance 
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indicators should measure the degree of transparency (Zeller et al., 2003). The money gained 
from profit, will in a NGO stay in the institution and is used to fund additional services and 
benefits for clients. For a SHF that gains profit, the profit can end up in the pockets of private 
shareholders. Since the poor have limited options in getting other credit and has a low 
bargaining power, they can charge extreme interest rates (CGAP, 2009b). 
 
More transparency and a greater focus on social performance could make actual social 
performance better	   (CGAP, 2007). High interest rate makes it more difficult for the poor to 
repay loans. When they cannot repay their loans, it can result in over-indebtedness, suicides 
etc., as mentioned in section 2.7. As a new variable for social performance, transparency will 
therefore be used. We would here expect that SHFs have higher interest rates than NGOs. 
 
Clients retention rate 
Client retention was rarely discussed or measured in the 1980s and 1990s. The last years, 
MFIs have started to understand that client retention have an impact on the institutions 
viability. A MFI, who has the welfare to the client as a goal, will want to look at the retention 
performance. Clients’ retention is if the customers keep coming back to the MFI. When a loan 
is paid back, the client can choose to renew the loan immediately, this is a case of client 
retention. If the customers think the services are helping them, they will come back and 
continue the use of microfinance services (Waterfield, 2006). 
 
The institutions should monitor the clients’ retention rate and satisfaction by client 
characteristics, and they should understand why clients exit the institution. The products that 
the institutions design should be appropriate to what the clients need and should not harm the 
clients. Before they disbursing a loan, they should conduct an appropriate client repayment 
capacity. The clients should be treated fair and respectfully (SPTF, 2012). 
 
If clients retention rate signals that clients are pleased with the services and get a good value 
from borrowing, then clients retention rate is a positive social indicator (Rhyne, 2011). The 
MIX and SPTF has client retention rate as their 11th indicator category to measure the social 
performance of MFIs (The MIX). In the SPTFs universals standards, clients retention rate is 
in one of the quantitative indicators of the six dimensions (SPTF, 2012). Therefore, as a new 
variable for social performance, we could use clients retention rate. We would here expect 
that NGOs have a higher clients retention rate than SHFs. 
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Staff turnover 
Staff turnover is the rotation of workers between firms, jobs and occupations, and from 
employment and unemployment. They, who are more likely to leave and most mobile, are the 
smartest and most talented employees. With a loss of key employees it can negatively impact 
the quality and innovation of services, and this can affect the satisfaction of the customers. An 
employee that is enthusiastic and loyal creates a good working relationship with the 
customers (Abbasi & Hollman, 2000). 
 
There is a high staff turnover in the microfinance industry. The monitoring and collection 
costs are higher than for other types of credit. There are a large number of small customers 
and a need for more information about the costumers, and this requires more staff to serve 
them. All this makes the microfinance industry having high administrative costs (Augsburg & 
Fouillet, 2010). Employees should be hired for both their commitment to the institutions 
social goals and for their ability to carry out social performance related job responsibilities. 
Employees should be trained and evaluated by the institution on both social and financial 
performance responsibilities that are related to their job. An institution should monitor the rate 
of employee turnover and understand why they exit, this to correct the institutional problems 
that lead to dissatisfaction and employee turnover (SPTF, 2012). 
 
An increase in the staff turnover has a negative effect on the MFIs. A high turnover rate 
negatively affects the productivity, performance levels, consistency and moral in MFIs. It is 
costly with high staff turnover due to expensive costs in the requirement and replacement 
process and talent movements to other MFIs or to other sectors. This may lead to a negative 
affect on the client`s satisfaction and retention towards the MFIs (Almugahed, 2011). Thus, as 
a new variable for social performance, we could use staff turnover. We would here expect that 
NGOs have a lower staff turnover than SHFs. 
 
4.3 Control Variables 
There are many factors, in addition to ownership, that can have an impact on the social 
performance in MFIs. I therefore include some control variables that may impact the social 
performance as well, to see if these makes a change in the conclusions. By adding some 
control variables to the research, we can reduce the risk of attributing explanatory power to 
independent variables that in reality is not responsible for the behaviour in the dependent 
variable. 
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Contextual factors must be considered when analysing performance indicators. These factors, 
and others, are all influencing performance indicators. The performance indicators must be 
put in the context of where and how the different MFIs are operating (Ledgerwood, 1999). I 
have decided to look at three control variables regarding the firm. These are age of the firm, 
size of the firm and regions the MFIs operate in. 
 
In addition, it may be important to look at some financial variables as control variables as 
well. This because of the dual objectives that MFIs have, and that there always exists a 
tradeoff between the financial and social performance. The book, The Economics of 
Microfinance (2010), defines five financial ratios for evaluating and comparing microfinance 
performance, which are often used as financial ratios. I will focus on three of them; operating 
self-sufficiency, return on assets and portfolio at risk. 
 
Size of the firm 
There could be that the size of the firms impacts the social performance in MFIs, this due to 
economies of scale. Economies of scale indicate increased efficiency when the firms increase 
in overall size of their operations. This means lower costs per unit produced when total units 
produced increase. For microfinance institutions, this measures cost savings when the size of 
its loan portfolio increases, in terms of both number of loans and the overall value of loan 
portfolios. If there exist an economy of scale, larger institutions would manage to offer 
microfinance services at a lower cost (interest rate) to customers than smaller institutions 
(Zacharias, 2008). 
 
Age of the firm 
Another variable that can impact the social performance is the maturity of the institutions. 
Young institutions expansion costs may not correspond with the revenues and should 
therefore not be compared to institutions that are more mature (Ledgerwood, 1999). When 
institutions are in their maturity stage, they are able to offer loans with lower rates than 
market interests rates, and are financially profitable at the same time. In the maturity stage, 
institutions are improving the efficiency and outreach. This can be done by either finding new 
client segments or by expanding geographically (Flosbach, 2015). 
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Region 
Geographical context is another variable. Latin America, Asia or Africa, may not be equal 
due to different performance indicators (Ledgerwood, 1999). The regions where the MFIs 
operate in can have different result when we look at ownership and social performance. To 
see if there are different results between regions, we can look at the different regions where 
MFIs operate in. I have chosen to divide the regions into six, after how the dataset are 
divided. The six regions are East Asia and Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central Asia (ECS), 
Latin America and Caribbean (LCN), Middle East and North Africa (MEA), South Asia 
(SAS), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSF). In the dataset there are 77 different countries.  
 
Operating self-sufficiency 
The first financial variable is the operating self-sufficiency ratio (OSS). This variable 
measures in which degree the operating revenues are covered by the operating costs in MFIs. 




𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
It is measured in percent and a value of 100 % indicates full operational self-sufficiency. If 
the value is less than 100 %, it means that the institution rely on continued outside funding to 
be able to maintain its current level of operation. With a value above 100%, an institution is 
able to continue the present operation without needing extra subsidies, and is then “self-
sufficient” (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). 
 
Return on assets 
The return on assets (ROA) is the second financial variable I will look at. Return on assets is 
one of the most common measures of profitability. It reflects how profitably in the institution 
deploys its assets (CGAP, 2009a). In other words, ROA measures how well an institution uses 
its total assets to generate returns, and we can write it as: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). 
 
Portfolio at risk 
The third financial variable I will use is the portfolio at risk (PAR). This can be written as: 
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𝑃𝐴𝑅 30𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 =
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  𝑎𝑡  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  (𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟  30  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠)
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  
Portfolio at risk can be explained as “the value of all loans outstanding that have one or more 
installments of principal overdue more than a certain number of days” (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010). When a full or partial payment is past due date, the whole outstanding loan 
balance is higher than normal risk of nonpayment. PAR is the standard measure of portfolio 
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5	  Data	  and	  Research	  Methodology	  
5.1 Dataset 
For the research question, I have quantitative data from Merslands Database. This contains 
478 MFIs from 77 different countries, from period 1996-2012. Five rating agencies have 
produced the reports the dataset contains from; they are MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The MFIs in this dataset only include rated MFIs that have agreed 
to let the reports from the rating agencies become publicly available. This means that there is 
a sample selection bias in this dataset. The percentage of missing values in the dataset range 
from 0% to over 70%, and this may influence the significance of result from the regression. 
For the variables in dollar, they have been annualized and dollarized using official exchange 
rates at the given time (Mersland, 2011). In the dataset, ownership types are divided into six 
types: Banks, NBFIs, NGOs, COOPs/Credit Union, State, and other. SHFs represent 33.98% 
of the MFIs, where 4.89% is Banks, and 29.09% is NBFIs. The majority of MFIs are NGOs 
represented with 51.13% of the MFIs in this dataset. The rest of the ownership types do not 
represent that many percentages, and I will not take these into account in this analysis. 
 
5.2 Econometric Models 
I will use the statistical software Stata to test if type of ownership has an impact on the social 
performance in MFIs. I am going to use simple bivariate regression for one independent 
variable and multivariate regression for several independent variables. First a regular t-test for 
the different hypothesis will be used. After adding some control variables, probit analysis will 
be used. I will also perform a robustness check. 
 
Simple bivariate regression 
Simple bivariate regression is when changes in the dependent variable, Y, are explained by 
changes in one single explanatory variable, x. It can be written as: 
𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥 + 𝜖 
The equation can be used to find the values of the parameters or coefficients, 𝛽! and 𝛽!. It 
also gives the line that best fit the data (Brooks, 2008). 
 
For the simple bivariate regression with one independent variable, the following six 
regressions can be written: 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑠 + 𝜖 
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𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝜖 
 
Multivariate regression 
Multivariate regression is used to examine the effect of all the explanatory variables together 
with the explained variable. It is more valid to have more than one explanatory variable at the 
same time in a regression equation. The following equation can be written: 
𝑌! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝜖 
Where 𝑡 = 1, 2,… ,𝑇 (Brooks, 2008). 
 
The six multivariate regression models with six control variables, will then be: 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽!𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑅30+ 𝜖 
 
Here, 𝑌! is the dependent variable that takes value 0 or 1. Ownership is the dependent variable 
and the social performance variables and the control variables are the independent variables. 
We want to model the probability of ownership being a NGO or SHF. This is affected by 
some independent variables, that is the social performance variables and the control variables. 
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5.3 Unpaired Sample T-test for one Independent Variable 
An unpaired sample t-test is appropriate to use whenever we want to compare the means of 
two different groups. The t-test checks if the means of two groups are statistically different 
from each other. When we look at the means, we may see that there is a difference, but if it is 
a reliable difference is more difficult to see. The t-test is measuring the difference between the 
groups, and compares this with the difference that is within the group. In addition to look at 
the difference between the means for two groups, we have to judge this relative to the spread 
or variability of their scores. The t-test can therefore be written as:  
𝑡 =
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑜𝑓  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠  
To find the top part of the formula, we find the difference between the means, 𝑋! − 𝑋! . For 
the bottom part of the formula, we have to take the variance of each group and divide it by the 
number of units in each group. These two values are added together, and we then take the 













There is a p-value for each t-value that tells if there is a probability that there is a real 
difference between the means. With a p-value equal to 0.05, there is a 5 % chance that there is 
no real difference (StatsCast: What is a t-test?, 2010 & Social Research Methods, 2006). 
 
5.4 Probit Analysis for Several Independent Variables 
A probit and a logit regression give very similar results, and it is therefore often preferences 
that decides if one use probit or logit. Probit follows a normal distribution, and has ticker tails 
than a logit distribution. While logit model often is used in health sciences, probit models are 
often used in more advanced econometric settings (Albright, 2015). Hence, I have decided to 
use probit regression. 
 
A probit regression is appropriate to use when the response take only one of two possible 
values. In a binomial distribution, the response Y is binary, and this can only take two values, 
0 and 1.  
𝑌! =
1  𝑖𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒  𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑆𝐻𝐹  
0          𝑖𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒  𝑖𝑠  𝑎  𝑁𝐺𝑂 
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(Rodrígues, 2007). The probit method predicts the probability that a certain event is observed, 
that it falls under a certain category of Y. An assumption is that the dependent variable 
follows a normal distribution (Gallani, Krishnan & Wooldridge, 2015). 
 
The cumulative normal distribution gives rise to the probit model. The function for the 










This function transforms the regression model so that the fitted values will be bounded 
between the 0 and 1 interval. The probit model is non-linear and is therefore more difficult to 
interpret than a linear probability model. The form of a probit function could be 𝑃! = 𝐹  (𝑥!!), 
where F represent the non-linear cumulative normal function (Brooks, 2008). 
 
A generic probit model can be written as: 
𝑌!∗ = 𝑥!!𝛽 + 𝑢! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋!! + 𝛽!𝑋!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝑢! 
Where: 
𝑌!∗ is a continuous real-valued index variable for observation 𝑖 that is unobservable or latent 
𝑋!" are regressor values for observation 𝑖 
𝛽! are regression coefficients 
𝑢! is a random error term for observation 𝑖 
 
We can present the observable outcomes of the binary choice problem by a binary indicator 
variable 𝑌!, and this is related to the unobserved dependent variable 𝑌!∗. This can be written as: 
𝑌! = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑌!∗ > 0   
𝑌! = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝑌!∗ ≤ 0   
𝑌! is the random indicator variable that represents the observed realization of a binomial 
process. The probabilities are: 
Pr  (𝑌! = 1) = Pr   𝑌!∗ > 0 = Pr  (𝑥!!𝛽 + 𝑢! > 0) 
Pr  (𝑌! = 0) = Pr   𝑌!∗ ≤ 0 = Pr  (𝑥!!𝛽 + 𝑢! ≤ 0) 
These binomial probabilities are represented in terms of the c.d.f. (cumulative distribution 
function) for the random variable 𝑢!: 
Pr  (𝑌! = 1) = Pr   𝑌!∗ > 0 = Φ(𝑥!!𝛽) 
Pr  (𝑌! = 0) = Pr   𝑌!∗ ≤ 0 = 1−Φ(𝑥!!𝛽) 
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Where Φ(𝑥!!𝛽) is the c.d.f. for the standard normal distribution (Abbott, 2009). 
 
5.5 Assumptions Regarding the Regressions 
Most of the variables have percentage or are dummies, and this means that they take values 
between 0 and 1. Since most of the variables take a value that is bounded between 0 and 1, 
there will not be any outliers that we need to be concerned about. There are two variables with 
USD as a measure; these are average loan size and total assets. For these I generate new 
variables with the log, and by looking at the dataset this looks okay without any values that 
are really high. We therefore don’t need to be concerned about any outliers here either. 
 
It is important to have some variance in the dataset. The results are true observations, so all 
the results will have a meaning in the analysis and potentially outliers will therefore not bias 
the result. Only if they do not represent true observations (e.g. data error), outliers could bias 
the results. 
 
Skewness and kurtosis 
For the variables average loan size and total assets, we can look at the skewness and kurtosis, 
to see if they are approximately normal distributed. I take the log of these two variables.  
 
When there is an asymmetry in the distribution, the distribution will deviate in one of the 
directions, and the distribution is then skewed. There is a positive skew if the value is larger 
than zero. Then a high concentration of the values will be at the left side of the mean and 
more extreme values on the right side of the mean. With a negative skew, the value is less 
than zero with a high concentration to the right of the mean, and extreme values to the left of 
the mean. If there is no skew, and thus a normal distribution, the skewness will be equal to 
zero (Acock, 2012). 
 
Kurtosis measures how thick the tails in a distribution are, the peakedness and shape. When 
there is a normal distribution, the kurtosis will be equal to three (in Stata). With a kurtosis 
value of less than three, the tails are too thick and hence the peak is too flat. If the kurtosis 
value is higher than three, the tails are too thin, and hence the distribution is too peaked 
(Acock, 2012). 
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 Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Log average loan size 6.5211 0.1216 3.6226 
Log total assets 15.1402 0.0094 3.0153 
Table 5.1: Skewness and kurtosis for average loan size and total assets 
 
From table 5.1 above, we can see that for the variables average loan size and total assets, there 
is almost no skew and kurtosis. The little positive skewness means that there is a little higher 
concentration to the left of the mean and a little more of the extreme values to the right of the 
mean. The small positive kurtosis means that the distribution is a little more peaked and the 
tails are thinner than a normal distribution. We can easier look at this in a graph. The graphs 
5.1 and 5.2 indicate that the two variables are approximately normally distributed. 
 
  
Figure 5.1 and 5.2: Plots with a normal density line and a kernel density line for the 
variables average loan size and total assets 
 
Errors 
Two types of error can be made regarding the hypothesis. Type 1 errors are when we reject 
𝐻! although it is true. This is termed by the level of significance. Type 2 errors are when we 
accept 𝐻! although it is false. This is not given by the level of significance, and is normally 
unknown. 
Pr 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒  𝐼  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝑃𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝐻! 𝐻!  𝑖𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒  
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6	  Data	  Analysis	  and	  Findings	  
In this part of the thesis, I will perform an unpaired sample t-test and a probit analysis to test 
for the difference between the two types of ownerships on social performance. I will analyze 
the results to see if there is a statistical significant difference. The two types of ownership are 
NGOs and SHFs, where SHFs consists of Banks and NBFIs. Then, as a robustness check to 
make the results more valid, I will perform a new probit test where the NBFIs are excluded 
from the analysis. I then compare the three tests for differences. Lastly, I see if there are some 
correlations between old and new variables. 
 
6.1 Regression Results Using T-test 
In this part, the results from the unpaired sample t-test are presented. I am going to deicide if I 
can reject or if I fail to reject the six null hypotheses presented in section 3.6. An independent 
t-test was run for each of the six dependent variables to determine if the means of the two 
groups (NGOs and SHFs) are statistically different from each other. We can then see if there 
is a difference between the types of ownership on the six social performances in MFIs. 
 
When I perform the t-tests, I use three different significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. They 
are denoted by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). It is then possible to see at which significance 
level each variable are statistically significant, or if they are not significant at all. The group 












t p Sig. 
%	  Female	  clients 0.755 0.590 0.0130 0.0187 7.467 0.000 *** 
%	  Rural	  clients 0.488 0.405 0.0293 0.0378 1.746 0.082 * 
Average	  loan	  size 937.5 1357.5 43.91 103.26 -­‐4.204 0.000 *** 
Transparency 0.619 0.667 0.0533 0.0559 -­‐0.615 0.540 -­‐ 
Clients	  ret.	  rate 0.687 0.635 0.0174 0.0254 1.764 0.080 * 
Staff	  turnover 0.211 0.213 0.0138 0.0151 -­‐0.227 0.821 -­‐ 
Table 6.1: Results from the t-tests between NGOs and SHFs, with significance levels 
 
From table 6.1 we see that the group means for percentage of female clients and average loan 
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size is significantly different at a 1% significance level. The results show that NGOs have a 
statistical significantly higher percentage of female clients than SHFs, and that NGOs have a 
statistical significantly lower rate of average loan size than SHFs. This means that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the group means between the two ownership types are equal for 
the variables percentage of female clients and average loan size, at a 1% significance level. 
 
Percentage of rural clients and clients retention rate have group means that are significantly 
different at a 10% significance level. This means that NGOs have a statistically significant 
higher percentage of rural clients and a statistically significant higher clients retention rate 
than SHFs, even though the differences are not that large. This means that we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the group means between the two ownership types are equal for the 
variables percentage of rural clients and clients’ retention rate, at a 10% significance level. 
 
Transparency and staff turnover are not significant at any of the three significance levels. The 
difference between the two groups means are therefore not statistically significant. This 
means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the group means between the two 
ownership types are equal for the variables transparency and staff turnover. 
 
6. 2 Effect Size 
Effect size is used to assess the practical significance of a result. By computing measures of 
effect size, we are able to describe the magnitude of the effect of ownership. We can use 






𝑛! − 1 𝑠!! + 𝑛! − 1 𝑠!!




A t-test´s effect size specify whether or not the difference between two groups´ average is 
large enough to have practical meaning, and whether or not it is statistically significant. 
Independent of whether the difference is statistically significant or not, it gives a concrete 
sense of whether a difference between two groups is meaningfully large (statwing.com). The 
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effect size allows measuring the size of mean differences to see how different they are. If the 
d-value is 0.2, there is a small effect, if d is 0.5 there is a medium effect, and if the d is 0.8 
there is a large effect. With a d above 0.8, the means are likely to be very different 
(statisticslectures.com). 
 
The results from the Cohen`s d effect results can be shown in a table: 
 Cohen´s d-value 95% confidence 
interval 
Effect results 
% Female clients 0.7145 0.5210 – 0.9074 Quite large effect 
% Rural clients 0.2601 −0.0333 – 0.5527 Small effect 
Average loan size -0.2749 −0.4036 − −0.1461 Small effect 
Transparency -0.0988 −0.4136 – 0.2164 Very small effect 
Client retention rate 0.2955 −0.0350 – 0.6251 Small effect 
Staff turnover -0.0269 −0.2595 – 0.2058 Very small effect 
Table 6.2: The Cohen’s d-values with effect results 
 
6.3 Regression Results Using Probit Analysis 
This section shows the results form the probit regression. Here we can see if the probit 
regression gives different results than the t-test when we add some control variables to the 
regressions. For some of the variables there are a lot of missing values, therefore I generate 
new variables that indicate missing values for those variables. This is to get more 
observations in the analysis. 
 
With a probit regression, I will check for the probability of being one of the two possible 
outcomes of ownership. Here the dependent variable is ownership, and is based on whether 
the type of ownership is SHFs and then takes value 1 or if the ownership is a NGO and takes 
value 0. Ownership is the binary response variable predicted by the model. The independent 
variables will be the six social performance variables. I run the analysis for these six social 
performance variables separately. I also add six control variables, three regarding the firm and 
three regarding the financial performance. 
 
We use the probit probability model to estimate the direction and significance of different 
variables on type of ownership. If the coefficients are positive, an increase in the predictor 
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leads to an increase in the predicted probability. With a negative coefficient, an increase in the 
predictor leads to a decrease in the predicted probability. The coefficient will show if the 
variables have a positive or a negative effect on type of ownership, but since the model is not 
linearly, it does not say how much the effect is. A positive effect means that there is a higher 
chance of ownership being a SHF than a NGO. With a negative effect there is a lower chance 
of ownership being a SHF than a NGO. A given alpha level, P>|z|, determines whether or not 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. If it is less than alpha, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
and the parameter estimate is considered statistically significant at that alpha level. As with 
the t-test, I use three different significance levels, 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), to see at 
which significance level each variable are statistically significant, or are not significant at all. 
 
Model 1 
First I run the regression with percentage of female clients as the independent variable and six 
other variables as control variables. Number of observations are 789, and this is the number of 
observations in the dataset where all of the response and predictor variables are non-missing. 
 
Table 6.3 below, shows that the coefficient, percentage of female clients, is negative. This 
means that there is a negative association between being a SHF and having female clients. 
This is statistically different from zero at a 1% level of confidence, which means that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that coefficient for percentage of female clients are zero. The odds 
of being a SHF are therefore lower if there are a higher percentage of female clients. 
 
	   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
%	  Female	  clients	   -­‐2.325	   0.438	   -­‐5.31	   0.000	   ***	  
Total	  assets	   0.132	   0.047	   2.79	   0.005	   ***	  
Age	   -­‐0.026	   0.008	   -­‐3.26	   0.001	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐0.691	   0.192	   -­‐3.59	   0.000	   ***	  
LCN	   -­‐1.570	   0.185	   -­‐8.48	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.400	   0.275	   -­‐5.09	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.156	   0.261	   -­‐4.43	   0.010	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.199	   0.102	   -­‐0.90	   0.369	   -­‐	  
OSS	   -­‐1.004	   0.233	   -­‐4.32	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.037	   0.781	   2.61	   0.009	   ***	  
PAR30	   -­‐0.493	   0.776	   -­‐0.63	   0.526	   -­‐	  
Table 6.3: Regression result with percentage of female clients 
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Model 2 
The next regression is with percentage of rural clients as the independent variable and the 
same six control variables as in the first model. Number of observations is 789. 
 
Table 6.4 below, shows that the social performance coefficient, percentage of rural clients, is 
negative. Holding all other characteristics constant, percentage of rural clients is lower among 
SHFs than among NGOs, this although the p-value is above conventional significance level. 
Since the coefficient is not significant at any of the three levels, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient for percentage of rural clients is zero. This means that we 
cannot reject that the odds off being a SHF are not affected by the percentage of rural clients. 
	  
	   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
%	  Rural	  clients	   -­‐0.778	   0.620	   -­‐1.25	   0.210	   -­‐	  
Total	  assets	   0.170	   0.047	   3.64	   0.000	   ***	  
Age	   -­‐0.027	   0.008	   -­‐3.41	   0.001	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐0.470	   0.185	   -­‐2.54	   0.011	   **	  
LCN	   -­‐1.479	   0.182	   -­‐8.11	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.462	   0.277	   -­‐5.27	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.162	   0.253	   -­‐4.60	   0.000	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.089	   0.217	   -­‐0.41	   0.682	   -­‐	  
OSS	   -­‐0.968	   0.227	   -­‐4.26	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.176	   0.760	   2.86	   0.004	   ***	  
PAR30	   -­‐0.087	   0.764	   -­‐0.11	   0.909	   -­‐	  




Here, I run the regression with average loan size as the independent variable. I generate a new 
variable with the log of average loan size. Number of observations are 621. 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the estimated coefficient for average loan size is positive, this means that 
there is a positive association between being a SHF and having a higher average loan size. 
This is statistically different from zero at a 1% level of confidence, which means we can 
reject the null hypothesis that coefficient for average loan size is zero. This means that the 
higher average loan size, the higher chance that type of ownership is a SHF. 
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   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
Average	  loan	  size	   0.4182	   0.0733	   5.71	   0.000	   ***	  
Total	  assets	   0.0075	   0.0561	   0.13	   0.893	   -­‐	  
Age	   -­‐0.0424	   0.0110	   -­‐3.86	   0.000	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐1.4289	   0.2619	   -­‐5.46	   0.000	   ***	  
LCN	   -­‐2.0507	   0.2386	   -­‐8.60	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.7562	   0.3194	   -­‐5.50	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.4523	   0.4333	   -­‐3.35	   0.001	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.5783	   0.2783	   -­‐2.08	   0.038	   **	  
OSS	   -­‐1.1756	   0.2583	   -­‐4.55	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.2376	   0.8897	   2.52	   0.017	   **	  
PAR30	   -­‐0.0335	   0.8330	   -­‐0.04	   0.968	   -­‐	  
Table 6.5: Regression result with the log of average loan size 
	  
Model 4 
I run the regression with transparency as the independent variable, and six variables as control 
variables. Number of observations are 789. 
 
Table 6.6 shows that the estimated coefficient for transparency is positive. The odds of being 
a SHF are then higher if there is transparency in the institution. This is statistically different 
from zero at a 5% level of confidence, which means that we can reject the null hypothesis that 
coefficient for transparency is zero. The odds of being a SHF are therefore higher if there is 
transparency. 
 
	   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
Transparency	   0.938	   0.473	   1.98	   0.048	   **	  
Total	  assets	   0.166	   0.047	   3.56	   0.000	   ***	  
Age	   -­‐0.029	   0.008	   -­‐3.59	   0.000	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐0.474	   0.186	   -­‐2.55	   0.011	   **	  
LCN	   -­‐1.454	   0.183	   -­‐7.96	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.438	   0.276	   -­‐5.21	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.144	   0.253	   -­‐4.51	   0.000	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.079	   0.217	   -­‐0.36	   0.716	   -­‐	  
OSS	   -­‐0.955	   0.226	   -­‐4.23	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.192	   0.755	   2.90	   0.004	   ***	  
PAR30	   -­‐0.079	   0.764	   -­‐0.10	   0.917	   -­‐	  
Table 6.6: Regression result with transparency 
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Model 5 
The next regression is with clients retention rate as the independent variable and the same six 
variables as control variables. Number of observations is 789. 
 
We see, in table 6.7, that the social performance coefficient, clients retention rate, is not 
significant at all. This means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for 
clients` retention rate is zero, at any of the significance levels. Holding other characteristics 
constant, clients retention rate is lower among SHFs than among NGOs, this although the p-
value is above conventional significance level. Thus, we cannot reject that the odds off being 
a SHF are not affected by the clients’ retention rate. 
	  
	   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
Clients	  ret.	  rate	   -­‐0.014	   0.850	   -­‐0.02	   0.987	   -­‐	  
Total	  assets	   0.141	   0.048	   2.96	   0.003	   ***	  
Age	   -­‐0.028	   0.008	   -­‐3.50	   0.000	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐0.458	   0.186	   -­‐2.47	   0.014	   **	  
LCN	   -­‐1.480	   0.185	   -­‐8.00	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.369	   0.277	   -­‐4.93	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.105	   0.252	   -­‐4.38	   0.000	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.056	   0.218	   -­‐0.26	   0.796	   -­‐	  
OSS	   -­‐0.922	   0.228	   -­‐4.04	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.125	   0.765	   2.80	   0.005	   ***	  
PAR30	   0.001	   0.765	   0.00	   0.999	   -­‐	  




The last regression is with staff turnover as the independent variable and still the same six 
variables as control variables. Number of observations is 789. 
 
Table 6.8 shows that the coefficient, staff turnover, is positive. Holding other characteristics 
constant, staff turnover is higher among SHFs than among NGOs, this although the p-value is 
above conventional significance level. Since the coefficient is not significant at any of the 
three levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for staff turnover is zero. 
Thus, we cannot reject that the odds off being a SHF are not affected by the staff turnover. 
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   Coeff.	   Std.err.	   (z)	   P>|z| 	   Sign.	  
Staff	  turnover	   0.818	   0.752	   1.09	   0.276	   -­‐	  
Total	  assets	   0.127	   0.048	   2.65	   0.008	   ***	  
Age	   -­‐0.031	   0.008	   -­‐3.87	   0.000	   ***	  
Region	   	   	   	   	   	  
ECS	   -­‐0.425	   0.187	   -­‐2.27	   0.023	   **	  
LCN	   -­‐1.442	   0.184	   -­‐7.86	   0.000	   ***	  
MEA	   -­‐1.395	   0.279	   -­‐4.99	   0.000	   ***	  
SAS	   -­‐1.060	   0.255	   -­‐4.16	   0.000	   ***	  
SSF	   -­‐0.066	   0.218	   -­‐0.30	   0.763	   -­‐	  
OSS	   -­‐0.892	   0.229	   -­‐3.89	   0.000	   ***	  
ROA	   2.258	   0.774	   2.92	   0.004	   ***	  
PAR30	   0.059	   0.768	   0.08	   0.939	   -­‐	  
Table 6.8: Regression result with staff turnover 
	  
For the control variables in the six different tables, we see that SSF and PAR30 in table 1-6 
do not have a significant impact at any of the three significance levels. ECS have a significant 
negative effect at a 5% level in table 2, 4, 5 and 6, and at a 1% level in table 1 and 3. ROA has 
a significant positive effect at a 1% level in table 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, and at a 5% level in table 3. 
PAR30 is significant at a 1% level in all tables, with a positive effect in table 5 and 6, and a 
negative effect in the rest of the tables. Total assets have a positive significant effect at a 1% 
level in all the tables. For the rest of the variables they all have a negative significant effect at 
a 1% level. As we can see, most of the control variables have a negative effect, which means 
that when we take the control variables into account, most of them will result in a lower 
chance of being a SHF than a NGO.  
 
6.4 Robustness Regression 
Since NBFIs have some similarities to NGOs as well, we can exclude NBFIs and only look at 
Banks and NGOs in the robustness test. I therefore run the probit regression again, to see if 
the results will vary when NBFIs are excluded from the regression. After running the new 
probit regressions, I found that there are many similarities between the regressions with and 
without NBFIs, but also a few differences. 
 
The similarities is that the variables percentage of female clients, percentage of rural clients, 
average loans size, and staff turnover all has the same direction and significance level as 
before; percentage of female clients still has a negative association and a 1% significance 
level, percentage of rural clients still has a negative association and is not significant at any 
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level, average loan size still has a 1% significance level and a positive direction, and staff 
turnover still has a negative association and is not significant at any level. 
 
The differences are that transparency has a positive association in both regressions, however it 
goes from being significant to not significant. Clients retention rate are still not significant, 
however the direction changes from negative to positive. 
 
6.5 Summary of the Tests 
Table 6.9 below, shows the significance levels for the different tests I have done. It also 
shows the direction of the coefficients. The symbol “+” tells that it has a positive effect of 
being a SHF, while “−” tells that there is a negative effect of being a SHF. Number of 
symbols tells how significant the coefficients are, and 0 implies that the coefficients are not 
significant. From table 6.9, we see that only the variables percentage of female clients and 
average loan size are significant in all three tests. The rest of the variables are not significant 
in two of three tests. 
 
 T-test Probit test Robustness test 
% Female clients − − − − − − − − − 
% Rural clients − 0 0 
Average loan size + + + + + + + + + 
Transparency 0 + + 0 
Clients retention rate − 0 0 
Staff turnover 0 0 0 
Table 6.9: A summary of significance levels from the three different tests 
 
Institutional theory can help explain why NGOs not always are more social than SHFs. Since 
the MFIs are operating in the same fields, they may become more alike, even though the types 
of ownership are different. Isomorphism may force one MFI to look more alike other MFIs 
who have the same set of environmental conditions. MFIs may have to be controlled under 
the same regulations or policies or they may try to copy other MFIs that do well, regardless of 
their ownership type. This can result in the dispersion into whether there are NGOs or SHFs 
who perform best in various socials Indicators. 
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Mersland et al. have mentioned that since there are many standardizations initiatives, the 
MFIs in the future may be more similar (Mersland, D'Espallier & Supphellen, 2012). An 
argument is that no single format for microfinance is likely to exist that simultaneously will 
satisfy all the different segments of the poor. There should be a wide array of financial 
choices. A plurality of microfinance programs needs to satisfy different developmental needs 
(Bhatt & Tang, 2001). 
 
6.6 Correlations Between old and new Variables 
We could also look at the correlation between the three old variables against the three new 
variables, to see if there are some correlations between them. The empirical correlation 
coefficient is defined as: 
𝑟!" =
∑!!!! (𝑥! − 𝑥)(𝑦! − 𝑦)
∑!!!! (𝑥! − 𝑥)! ∑!!!! (𝑦! − 𝑦)!
 
(Blæsild & Granfeldt, 2002). 
 
The correlation makes us judge the strength of any linear association between two variables. 
The correlation coefficient can only take a value within a definite range of −1 and +1. If there 
is an exact positive correlation between the variables, the correlation value 𝜌 = +1. If there is 
an exact negative correlation between the variables, the correlation value 𝜌 = −1. If there is 
no correlation between the variables, the correlation value 𝜌 = 0. The closer the correlation 
number is to −1 or +1, the stronger is the correlation (Thomas, 2005). 
 
We would expect that MFIs with high percentage of female clients and high percentage of 
rural clients also have a higher transparency, a higher clients retention rate and a lower staff 
turnover. An MFI with high average loan size would we expect to have a lower transparency, 
a lower clients retention rate and a higher staff turnover. Table 6.10 shows the correlation 
results, where the signs +/− in brackets are the signs we expect to get. 
 
 Transparency Clients retention rate Staff turnover 
% Female clients − 0.1281 (+) − 0.0961 (+) + 0.3238 (−) 
% Rural clients − 0.1695 (+) − 0.1063 (+) − 0.2932 (−) 
Average loan size + 0.1246 (−) − 0.2859 (−) − 0.0865 (+) 
Table 6.10: Correlations between old and new variables 
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As we can see form table 6.10 above, percentage of female clients has a small negative 
correlation with transparency and clients retention rate, and a positive correlation with staff 
turnover. This means that a higher percentage of female clients would result in a lower 
transparency, a lower clients retention rate, and a higher staff turnover. This is the opposite of 
what we would expect. 
 
For percentage of rural clients, there is a small negative correlation with transparency, clients 
retention rate, and staff turnover. This means that a higher percentage of rural clients would 
result in a lower transparency, a lower clients retention rate, and a lower staff turnover. The 
correlation between percentage of rural clients and staff turnover shows what we would 
expect, the other two shows the opposite of what we would expect. 
 
The average loan size variable shows a small positive correlation with transparency, and a 
small negative correlation with clients’ retention rate and staff turnover. This means that with 
a higher average loan size it would result in a higher transparency, a lower clients retention 
rate, and a lower staff turnover. The correlation between average loan size and clients 
retention rate is as expected, but the two others shows the opposite of what we would expect. 
 
We can therefore conclude that some correlations are as expected and some are not. The 
reason why it diverges may be because social performance in MFIs is a very broad and 
divergent concept. There are so many ways in measuring social performance and I have only 
looked at six of them. Therefore it will almost be a coincidence if the correlations would be as 
expected or not. Furthermore, the correlations are not strong between any of the variables. So 
even if they show correlations as expected or not, small changes could change the correlation 
from being positive to negative, or the opposite. We could therefore not say that the 
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7	  Conclusion	  
In this thesis, I have examined the effect of two ownership types on six different social 
performance measures in microfinance institutions. MFIs are well known financial 
institutions established for helping unbankable people. Type of ownership differs in the MFIs, 
but I have focused on NGOs and SHFs in this research. MFIs have a dual goal in achieving 
both financial sustainability and outreach to the poor. Social performance has in recent years 
become a topical issue in discussions. More than ever before, there is a broad agreement that 
measuring social performance is important for MFIs to be able to achieve their social mission. 
Social performance indicators will also help MFIs measure their social results and to report to 
their external stakeholders. 
 
I performed three different tests. First a t-test, then a probit regression with control variables, 
and finally I performed a robustness check that where excluding NBFIs. Only the variable 
percentage of female clients and average loan size is significant in all three tests, and this at a 
1% significance level. This could indicate that NGOs, compared to SHFs, have a higher 
percentage of female clients and a lower average loan size. Since the rest of the variables are 
not significant in at least two of three tests, it is not possible to say that there is a significant 
difference between NGOs and SHFs for these variables. NGOs could therefore have a higher 
social performance on some variables, but it is not said that they have better social 
performance for all variables or in general. Institutional theory was one theory that can help 
explaining why NGOs not always are more social than SHFs. Isomorphism may force MFIs 
to look more similar to each other. In addition, as mentioned earlier in section 3.5, a mixture 
of different ownership types could be what is best for the customers in MFIs. 
 
The results indicate that there are not clear differences between NGOs and SHFs. Even 
though NGOs had two social variables that indicate that they have a higher social 
performance than SHFs, this was not the case for all the variables. Since the numbers of social 
variables used are a very small percentage of number of social variables that exists, it is 
difficult to come with a general conclusion. To get a general conclusion if there is a difference 
between NGOs and SHFs in relation to social performance, many more variables should be 
examined. There are a lot of variables that could be tested and taken into account when 
analyzing social performance. Other social performance variables could have shown other 
results. I only looked at six variables, three that are often used to measure social performance 
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and three that have not been used that much. There is always someone who searches after new 
and better measurers. The three “new” variables I used are some examples of measures that 
could be used. 
 
The data do have some selection bias since it contains data only from the rated MFIs that 
willingly have agreed to let the reports from the rating agencies become publicly available. In 
addition, there are some of the MFIs that do not have all the values we need. All the missing 
values in the dataset are something that could be a problem when researching. If we had all 
the values from all MFIs, maybe the results would have been different. The percentage of 
missing values may influence the significance of result from the regression. 
 
When measuring social performance, there are a number of other variables that could be used. 
It is possible to extend in many different directions. For example, it could be interesting to 
concentrate on only new variables, and look at several more variables to see if some are more 
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APPENDIX	  
A.1 Reflection paper 
Brief summary of the main theme 
In my master thesis I have studied how different types of ownership affect different social 
performance indicators in microfinance institutions. Microfinance is the provision of financial 
services to “unbankable” people. I looked at two different types of ownership, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and shareholder firms (SHFs). Where shareholder 
firms consists of non-bank financial institutions and banks. Then I looked at how social 
performance indicators changed after these two types of ownership, if one type had better 
social performances than the other. The six social performance indicators I looked at were 
percentage of female clients, percentage of rural clients, average loan size, transparency, 
clients retention rate, and staff turnover. 
 
The results from the study showed that only the variable percentage of female clients and 
average loan size was significant in all three tests, at a 1% significance level. This could 
indicate that NGOs has a higher percentage of female clients and a lower average loan size 
than SHFs. For the rest of the variables there was not possible to say that there was a 
significant difference between NGOs and SHFs, this because they are not significant in at 
least two of the three tests. I also looked at if there where some correlation between old and 
new variables. I found that some correlations are as expected and some are not. The reason 
why it diverges may be because social performance in MFIs is a very broad and divergent 
concept. 
 
As mentioned in the thesis, there are a lot of variables that could have been tested and taken 
into account when analyzing social performance. In addition, there where many missing 
values in the dataset that could be a problem when researching and getting valid results. 
 
Internationalization 
The unit of analysis in this thesis is ownership types in microfinance institutions. There is a 
large growth in the microfinance industry, and more clients every year. As the microfinance 
industry grow, there also is a growth in the scope of organizational forms in the industry, 
which has become broader. The most dominating organizational forms are NGOs, SHFs and 
COOPs, there also exists other types. They all have different structures and incentives. Even 
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though the main goal in the microfinance industry is to reduce poverty, there have over the 
years been many that try to earn profit in the industry. 
 
Since there are many standardization initiatives that try to find the best ways to measure both 
financial and social performance. There may be that MFIs become more similar in the future. 
When there are more companies that occur in the industry, there will be more competition. 
With a higher competition in the microfinance industry, the customers will have more to 
choose from. Maybe this could result in cheaper and better product for the clients in the long 
run, because MFIs may have to compete with each other to get the customers. Then the 
business could be more cost effective. 
 
Microfinance as an idea has existed for several decades, even before the ideology of 
development where thought off. The United Nations declared year 2005 as the year of 
microcredit. Microcredit became well known in 2006 when Mohammed Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank (founded in 1983) won the Nobel Peace prize. This made a change in the 
perception in how the world sees microcredit. It was now seen as poor people who were 
entrepreneurs, who have needed skills and expertise, but who need financial resources to 
initiate their own business. 
(Source: http://changewebelievein.blogspot.no/2011/06/micro-finance-reflective-essay.html) 
 
More and more people around the world know about microfinance, and many wants to help. 
However, as mentioned in the Brennpunkt documentary 30th of November 2010, after 35 
years of microfinance, we have no evidence that microcredit reduce poverty. There is an 
increasing evidence of stories about families with problems. Families who get too big debt, 
families that get ruined when they get more capital. Instead there should be developed a 
model that gives people the means to income-building activities to get them out of poverty, 
instead of giving them debt. 
 
Innovation 
There are several different segments of the poor. Not everyone needs the same kind of 
product and services, and not everyone is equally poor. There should be a wide array of 
financial services that the poor could choose from. A variety of microfinance programs need 
to satisfy different developmental needs. Maybe MFIs could specialize against different types 
of segments, to optimize these. Having a mixture of different types of ownership that 
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specialize on different segments, is perhaps better than having only one type of ownership. 
 
There is an expectation that clients who are getting services from the different microfinance 
institutions should start their own business to be able to earn money and then repay their 
loans. However, Thomas Dichter, an international development consultant, says that most 
people in the world are not entrepreneurs. All could not be Bill Gates, so why do we expect 
that the poor are any different? Most people want a stable economy and jobs, the same with 
the poor. They want security, not everyone will stand in the street and sell rice beside 20 
others who also sells rice, and earn only small change. 
(Source: Brennpunkt documentary 30th of November 2010). 
 
One idea is that in addition to provide poor people with financial services, there should also 
be more focus in offering assistance to get education and to get out in the workplace. Then, 
for they who want to, could get a more "normal" job and in that way be able to earn money 
for a living. 
 
Responsibility 
Microfinance institutions often have a dual goal, which is to both achieve financial 
sustainability and outreach to the poor. For the last years, there has been discussion of what 
type of ownership benefits the poor. While some institutions try to reduce poverty, some 
institutions try to make as high profit as possible. This could be an ethical challenge since 
getting a higher profit may result in lower outreach to the poor. 
 
The risk needs to be well managed so that investors, lenders and borrowers have confidence 
in the organization. If the risk is poorly managed, the institutions may not meet its objectives. 
The management can prepare for and try to minimize disasters and conflicts. By having a 
careful screening, monitoring and evaluation, a strong credit culture, and accurate reporting, 
they could have a successful risk management. For microfinance institutions, that mostly have 
both financial and social objectives, should have an informed risk calculation. The institution 
could then be able to assess new market opportunities and ensure that operations that already 
exist are constantly improved. They could also deliver competitive and effective goods and 
services to its customers. 
(Source:	  http://www.microfinancegateway.org/topics/risk-management) 
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A competitive advantage for microfinance institutions is that there is not a market for 
financial services from before in rural areas. The size of the market for microfinance 
institutions is therefore quite large market since the market is all that don’t have access to 
typical banking services. This is a market where they don’t have an access to financial 
services. This is therefore a blue ocean opportunity for MFIs. Regular banks don’t provide 
financial services to the poor, therefore there is not that much competition for MFIs that wants 
to start and provide financial services in rural areas for poor people. A competitive 
disadvantage for MFIs is that they charge higher average interest rates on their loans than 




Many customers in the microfinance industry cannot read and write. This result in many 
clients who signs on papers without knowing what it says. Many are desperate to get loans, 
and therefore do what they must to get it. The different institutions therefore have a 
responsibility over the clients. They must make sure that customers know what they are 
signing and that the institutions are not trying to trick them. More transparency in the 
organizations could be a start in making organizations responsible to customers.  
 
